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In the aftermath of September 11, the people and government of the United States confronted a new 
reality--so too did the health care community. 1-3 The attacks revealed a number of vulnerabilities 
with respect o the health care system's infrastructure and ability to respond to terrorism. Although 
September 11 represents an unprecedented disaster in the United States, one would shudder to imag- 
ine the repercussions if biological or chemical agents, radioactive material, or nuclear weapons had 
been employed. The truth is, September 11 could have been much worse. Yet in the 3 1/2 years since 
the attacks, arguably little progress has been made. 
Underlying this lack of progress is a pattern of declining public confidence in the health care 
system's ability to respond effectively to a terrorist incident, and a discernible disconnect to the 
government's call for individuals and families to be prepared for any major emergency, natural or 
manmade. 4 Basic steps for individual and family emergency readiness include stocking food, water, 
and medications; forming evacuation plans and establishing emergency contacts; and possessing 
battery-operated ra ios, flashlights, and other equipment. But studies of citizen response to calls for 
enhancing personal readiness uggest few actually make such arrangements. 4 
To understand the unique dynamics of preparedness for terrorism and for disasters in general, my 
staff and I at the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University's Mailman School of 
Public Health and the Children's Health Fund have worked to address 3 key questions: 
1. How does the American public feel about and respond to terrorism and the government's a so- 
ciated agenda? 
2. What does being "prepared" actually mean, and what does this mean in particular for the health 
care system? 
3. How do physicians function in their professional roles and as citizens and members of families 
in the aftermath of a terrorist event? 
Answering these questions requires that we first understand the new realities of the post-September 
11 world. The United States is still in what must be considered the immediate aftermath of an un- 
precedented surprise attack by foreign interests on civilian targets within its continental borders. It is 
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critical to discern where we are now and to 
understand how truly unprepared the public, 
government, and health care system are in the 
event of another terrorist attack. 
The New Reality 
The attacks of September 11 were only the 
beginning of a series of events that cumulatively 
have changed the US public's sense of vulner- 
ability at home and connection to current and 
historical events overseas. What actually tran- 
spired in this country in the weeks, months, and 
years following the attacks is worth reviewing. 
Just weeks after September 11, an American 
Airlines flight leaving from John F. Kennedy 
Airport en route to the Dominican Republic 
crashed immediately after takeoff into a neigh- 
borhood in Queens, a borough of New York 
City. It was officially concluded that the crash 
was not related to terrorism. However, both the 
timing and geographic proximity of the crash to 
the events of September 11, the coincidence of 
another tragic incident involving a commercial 
airliner, and the ambiguity surrounding the 
official explanations for the crash exacerbated 
a growing sense of anxiety, uncertainty, and 
vulnerability among Americans, especially New 
Yorkers. Government reassurances that this 
crash was not related to terrorism were greeted, 
understandably, with considerable skepticism. 
If the American Airlines crash was question- 
able with respect o terrorist origins, there was 
little doubt about the anthrax mailings shortly 
thereafter. These were aimed at government and 
media officials and were undoubtedly a terrorist 
act, be it by a domestic perpetrator (as speculat- 
ed) or an international plot. Only a handful of 
victims were hospitalized or killed, yet a nation- 
wide panic and disruptions to US business and 
governmental functions, including mail services, 
ensued. To this day the anthrax case has not 
been solved who executed the mailings, where 
the anthrax spores came from, or if the attacks 
will occur again remains unknown. 
The anthrax mailings helped spur a national 
reaction--or overreaction, led by the White 
House--to begin vaccinations against smallpox 
and increase stockpiles of vaccine, antibiotics, 
and antidotes against biological and chemical 
agents. These strategies were pushed hard by 
the administration during the buildup to the 
war, while speculation grew as to whether Iraq 
would use smallpox as a biological weapon 
against he US public. The smallpox vaccination 
plan called for a "phase one" of initial vaccina- 
tions against smallpox for some 500,000 health 
care workers. This was to have been followed 
by vaccinations for emergency responders and a 
large section of the populace. However, <40,000 
vaccinations were actually administered. Health 
professionals, first responders, and the general 
public were profoundly skeptical of smallpox 
prophylaxis because the government failed to 
make a credible case for the necessity of this 
drastic step. The flawed vaccination program 
provided a sobering picture of US vulnerability 
to biological and chemical terrorism, and the 
government and public health system's limita- 
tions to prepare and protect Americans against 
such an attack. This failure may have greatly 
reduced confidence in the government's ability 
to develop and implement terrorism prepared- 
ness plans. 
Though the anthrax mailings and American 
Airlines crash were probably not connected and 
may not have been related to international ter- 
rorism, terrorist attacks in other parts of the 
world have gone unabated since September 11. 
From al Qaeda-backed violence in Madrid, Bali, 
Morocco, and Beslan, Russia, to the ongoing 
conflicts in Israeli and Palestinian communities, 
terrorist incidents have increased both in num- 
ber and scope. In the wake of these incidents-- 
as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
exceptional events like the Northeast-Midwest 
blackout in the summer of 2002 and the Wash- 
ington, DC-area sniper shootings, terror alert 
fluctuations, and media attention on a wide 
range of threats and vulnerabilities--a persistent 
unease and unrest among the American public 
has emerged. 
The fact is, true security, especially in the 
United States, is impossible to achieve. In a free 
democratic society, full security cannot be 
reached without suspension or reduction of the 
very benefits being defended from terrorism. 
66 
I. Redlener 
However, a level of public, government, and 
health care system preparedness, and an effec- 
tive ability to respond in the event of a terrorist 
attack, must and should be expected. It is in this 
readiness capacity that our country remains 
alarmingly lacking. 
Addressing the Key Questions 
I began these remarks outlining 3 key ques- 
tions with respect to public attitudes about pre- 
paredness, what preparedness actually means, 
and what the challenges are for physicians in 
the age of terrorism. The answers, like the ques- 
tions themselves, continue to evolve. 
How does the American public feel 
about and respond to terrorism and 
the government's associated agenda? 
Since September 11, the National Center for 
Disaster Preparedness and the Children's Health 
Fund have been surveying the US public as well 
as a subsample of New York City residents on 
terrorism, preparedness, and the government's 
associated agenda. The first survey was conduct- 
ed about a month after September 11, and sub* 
sequently administered 6 months, I year, 2 years, 
and 3 years later by the Marist College Institute 
for Public Opinion, Poughkeepsie, New York. 4 
In the most recent survey in August 2004, 
three quarters (75%) of the US public described 
themselves as "concerned" about ongoing ter- 
rorism, exactly the same percentage found in 
the previous year. Despite high levels of con- 
cern, 63% of respondents reported not having 
made even the most basic of disaster prepara- 
tions, including having stocks of food, water, 
and medications; forming evacuation plans and 
establishing emergency ontacts; and obtaining 
battery-operated radios, flashlights, and other 
necessities for emergencies. 
In addition to not being personally prepared, 
the public expressed eclining confidence in 
the government's ability to protect against a 
terrorist attack. In 2003, 62% believed that the 
government would be able to protect their 
community in the event of a terrorist attack; in 
2004 that number declined to 53%. When asked 
about specific elements of national prepared- 
ness, confidence was also low and declining. An 
exception to this was the increasing confidence 
the public had in the government's ability to 
protect airports, with 61% of those surveyed 
expressing confidence in this function, an 
increase from 59% in 2003 and 55% in 2002. 
Virtually all other areas showed decreasing lev- 
els of confidence, including the government's 
ability to protect buses, trains, and nuclear facil- 
ities, and to prevent radiological "dirty" bomb- 
ings. For all of these functions, public confi- 
dence levels were <50%, a decline from previous 
years. 
This lack of confidence contributes to the 
alarming results of repeated surveys: more than 
half of the respondents have stated that they 
would not cooperate with official directions to 
evacuate if ordered to do so. This underscores a 
fundamental flaw in crisis planning at all levels: 
disaster preparedness forterrorist events has not 
fully considered the issues that actually drive 
people's behavior in emergency situations. Our 
surveys have found a great reluctance among 
people, at least when asked in advance, to obey 
official demands to evacuate until the where- 
abouts or condition of children, other family 
members, or friends can be accounted for. This 
may be clue in part to the low levels of confi- 
dence the public has in government, along with 
a sense of incompetent handling of major pub- 
lic efforts such as solving the anthrax mystery 
or vaccinating against smallpox in 2002. 
In addition to their loss of confidence in 
government generally, Americans report ever- 
decreasing levels of confidence in the health 
care system's ability to prepare for and respond 
to a terrorist event--and these levels are falling 
faster and lower than we observed for any other 
preparedness sector. In 2002, the public's confi- 
dence level in the ability of the health care sys- 
tem to respond to a chemical, biological, radio- 
logical, or nuclear attack was 53%; in 2003 that 
figure decreased to 46%, and by 2004 it was 
39%. This protracted ecline represents a criti- 
cal and disturbing trend in public perception. 
The consequences of low confidence levels-- 
in tandem with heightened concern about fu- 
ture terrorist attacks and poor acceptance of 
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official exhortations to "prepare" for disasters-- 
represent a unique challenge for government 
and the health care system. 
Still another factor at play may affect the pub- 
lic's confidence in and compliance with basic 
preparedness planning. Although the United 
States is a nation at war, very little has been 
asked of the public in terms of sacrifice, which 
has been true of virtually all other periods of 
major conflict in US history. The government 
has neither established a military draft nor cre- 
ated rationing programs, and there is no public 
financial burden. In fact, taxes during the cur- 
rent war period have been dramatically cut 
twice. Essentially the government is saying: "We're 
at war, the terrorist hreat is real, but don't panic 
and here's a tax refund." These are unusually 
mixed signals that undermine the government's 
message for the public to be prepared and vigi- 
lant, and exacerbate lower confidence levels in 
public strategies for homeland security. 
What does being "prepared" actually 
mean,  and what does this mean in 
particular for the health care system? 
With the exception of populations living in 
areas prone to natural or weather-related disas- 
ters, emergency preparedness i  an unfamiliar 
and potentially unsettling challenge for most 
individuals and families. The very definition of 
what it means to be prepared is problematic. 
"Prepared" is a relative, indistinct concept hat 
includes a spectrum of behavior ranging from 
extreme complacency to an almost paranoid 
sense of danger and readiness. Somewhere be- 
tween these 2 extremes is where the public 
needs to be. An optimal evel of preparedness is 
based on awareness of risk: thinking about and 
planning ahead for the safety and whereabouts 
of family members, and practical preparations 
for "sheltering in place" or moving rapidly from 
an area of danger. In the event of either a terror- 
ist attack or a natural disaster, people should be 
prepared to be without external sources of food 
and water, working utilities, or essential medica- 
tions for at least 3 days. 
Personal and family preparedness can never 
be perfect. Even those who are well prepared 
could have their plan rendered useless if, for 
example, they are on vacation when a terrorist 
event occurs. In Israel, where gas masks are issued 
to every family, concerns have been raised about 
the practicality of such a program. What if the 
attack occurs when a person is walking on the 
beach or in a park? Must citizens carry the masks 
everywhere? And how will a mask protect 
against a radiological device? Should radiation 
suits and Geiger counters be issued? Of course, 
none of this is reasonable. A point is reached 
where preparedness becomes an impossible x- 
ercise as a result of the infinite scenarios that 
may occur. The goal for the public must be to 
ensure that each individual and family is per- 
sonally organized for short-term subsistence. 
The rest is in the hands of the government, first 
responders, and the health care system. 
No defined national standard exists as to how 
the health care system should prepare for a ter- 
rorist attack, partly because of the range of pos- 
sible acts. However, benchmarks must be estab- 
lished so that funding can be developed and 
measurements of progress--and shortcomings-- 
can be determined. Huge sums are being allocat- 
ed even in the absence of clear definitions of 
what health care system preparedness is. As bil- 
lions of dollars are funneled into random pro- 
grams of health preparedness, other basic ongo- 
ing public health needs may be shortchanged. 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, vaccina- 
tion programs, and access to basic health care, 
to name a few examples, still need substantial 
public and government support. Many public 
health professionals are concerned about the 
diversion of funds from these long-standing 
needs to the ill-defined, resource-intensive n w 
efforts to create some level of preparedness for 
terrorism in the United States. 
Clearly, many complex barriers make it diffi- 
cult to establish an effective level of prepared- 
ness for the health care system. Its sheer size 
and complexity are important factors. "The 
system" includes the entire public health infra- 
structure as well as the nation's 5000 hospi- 
tals, thousands of community health centers and 
nursing homes, and individual practicing physi- 
cians. There is no single overriding authority 
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and there are many impediments o organizing 
effective emergency planning, including juris- 
dictional conflicts and the lack of both consis- 
tent, knowledgeable, designated spokespersons 
and clear strategies for managing major disas- 
ters in many communities. Until recently, most 
public health preparedness planning has been 
developed in metaphorical "silos," with bodies 
and institutions for the most part planning in 
isolation from each other. A successful prepared- 
ness plan will require greater collaboration to 
reach a level of coordination among public 
health bodies. Only through a coordinated sys- 
tem will issues such as surge capacity and redun- 
dancy be addressed, and true preparedness 
be achieved. 
How do physicians function in their 
professional roles and as citizens and 
members of families in the aftermath 
of a terrorist event? 
A terrorist event presents a special challenge 
for physicians, whose professional responsibili- 
ties to respond to a major emergency may well 
be in conflict with the natural and appropriate 
need to ensure the safety of family and loved 
ones. It cannot be assumed that all physicians 
would respond to a terrorist attack or remain at 
work if an attack occurs during work hours. Nor 
should it be assumed that doctors would aban- 
don their posts or responsibilities. Such situations 
are deeply unfamiliar and terrifying for the vast 
majority of medical professionals who have not 
been trained to work under such conditions or 
have not experienced them firsthand. Studies 
conducted by Qureshi et al 2 suggest that a third 
or more of a hospital's professional staff may 
not report to or remain at work after a serious 
bioterror attack. 
The reality is that physicians' behaviors in 
the aftermath of terrorism will be highly vari- 
able and dependent on a number of factors, 
including specific family or home-communi ty  
responsibilities and the nature of the attack. 
Another consideration is the physician's per- 
ception of his or her role within the medical 
profession. A practicing primary care doctor, 
an infectious disease specialist, or an emer- 
gency room physician may each perceive 
different obligations and have different views 
of professional responsibility. Fear of the un- 
known and literally being in harm's way may 
be key determinants for many doctors facing 
terribly difficult options in the extreme mer- 
gency of a terrorist attack. 
Physicians have a duty to serve, but they are 
also parents, spouses, and children. Moral clarity 
may not be readily apparent. Imagine a doctor in 
a hospital that must be evacuated. In that hospi- 
tal may be 25 infants on respirators in the neona- 
tal intensive care unit and a dozen adult patients 
in the coronary care unit. Imagine further that 
there is only enough time and resources to evacu- 
ate some of these patients. How will decisions be 
made, and by whom? An unlimited number of 
extraordinary moral dilemmas may follow in the 
wake of terrorism, many directly in the purview 
of doctors truggling to do the right thing. 
When I am asked how physicians can per- 
sonally address these matters, I suggest not 
waiting until a major crisis occurs to begin the 
process. Discussions with family members and 
friends should cover plans for safeguarding 
themselves, locating and gathering children, 
and understanding communicat ion and evacu- 
ation strategies. When devising a family emer- 
gency plan, contingencies should be consid- 
ered to account for the physician needing to 
remain on duty or report to work. Developing 
a family disaster plan is essential for the popu- 
lation at large, but critical for families of physi- 
cians. With such a plan, a physician can be 
mental ly prepared to make decisions under cri- 
sis conditions, from both a personal and a pro- 
fessional perspective. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our country has much work to accomplish 
before achieving an optimal level of prepared- 
ness for major disasters and terrorism. As the 
public remains unprepared and expresses di- 
minishing confidence in the government and 
health care system, billions of dollars continue 
to be spent on preparedness planning. Yet "pre- 
pared" is still undefined, with no benchmarks 
to measure actual progress. 
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In the event of a terrorist attack, the challen- 
ges for physicians will be extraordinary. Under- 
standing one's roles and responsibilities as a 
doctor and as a member  of a family during such 
a situation requires thought fu l  considerat ion 
long before the crisis actually occurs. 
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